Executive Summary

The Task Force on Collaborative Approaches to Security was established under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2004. This report emanates from its Sub-Working Group (SWG), led by InterAction and UNICEF in close liaison with the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and tasked to examine the implementation of the Menu of Options for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration (MoO) which had been approved by the IASC in 2001. The SWG sought to examine the current relevance of the MoO and determine its utility through a survey that was distributed both to IGO/NGO/UN staff by InterAction and to Field Security Coordination Officers (FSCOs) by DSS.

Analysis of the findings indicated a significant lack of knowledge of the MoO in the field. There were some examples of implementation, but these appeared to be limited to situations of extreme insecurity and probably resulted out of necessity, as opposed to standard application of the principles. Further, there was no evidence that lessons learned were shared or adopted routinely as good practice. What became clear from the survey, however, was that the recommendations that emerged in 2001 remain as relevant today as they were when first formulated.

With the above in mind, it is the conclusion of the SWG that the MoO still provides a very sound framework for improving security collaboration between all humanitarian actors in the field and, as such, should be re-launched. To this end, the SWG has updated, revised and renamed the MoO to better reflect its purpose and intent, and strongly recommends that it be adopted by the IASC for active and robust implementation on a country by country basis.
Introduction
Following the recommendations of a December 2003 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals meeting, a Taskforce on Collaborative Approaches to Security (TCAS) was formed to explore collaborative measures that could be taken by the humanitarian community to address increasing insecurity in the context of field missions. Ultimately, the High-Level Humanitarian Forum (HLHF) held in March 2004 laid out the dimensions of the TCAS’s work.

The HLHF, attended by the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, IOM, as well as approximately 20 international and national NGOs, focused on the changing security environment and on options for the humanitarian community to respond to it. The resulting discussions that took place at the HLHF effectively charged the TCAS with examining issues that would assist the humanitarian community in answering the question of how to respond to the perceived increase in security threats.

The TCAS in consultation with the IASC Working Group determined the requirements for distinct Sub-Working Groups (SWGs) on the following issues:

1. **Initiating the Dialogue** - Establish regular and sustained contact with ‘unconventional’ interlocutors who have influence in zones of conflict and instability in which we work. The SWG will determine how this can be practically achieved.

2. **Codes of Conduct** - Assemble relevant existing codes of conduct for humanitarian personnel (with a focus on staff behaviour), identify elements of those codes pertinent to this discussion and determine the most effective way to ‘roll-out’ what they have identified for system wide consideration.

3. **Recommendations for Action & Menu of Options** - Propose a dissemination scheme for the Menu of Options for security collaboration in the field between UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners, as well as make recommendations for monitoring its implementation.

4. **Pilot Countries for Collaborative Action** - Determine criteria for selection of countries and suggest collaborative initiatives, derived from the work of the other three SWGs, that can be effectively piloted.

This report is focused purely on the results of the third SWG (‘Recommendations for Action & Menu of Options’).

**Recommendations for Action & Menu of Options Sub-Working Group**

Chaired by InterAction and UNICEF, the SWG early on sought the counsel and participation of UNSECOORD (now incorporated under the umbrella of UNDSS), acknowledging that any work on this topic would be incomplete without its participation.

The “Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration,” also referred to as “Menu of Options” – MoO - see annexes II and III) is in effect a list of potential risk-mitigating strategies which may be undertaken both individually and jointly by UN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs to improve the collective security of the humanitarian community. Security coordination and collaboration between the UN and NGOs is a well-established and widespread practice – application of the Guidelines is manifest to varying degrees, knowingly or not. The members of
the sub-working group agree that the Guidelines, representing the culmination of collaborative efforts of the IASC Working Group, remain a sound document.

Working from this premise, it was concluded that while the document is sound, awareness of the document’s existence is minimal within the humanitarian community and bringing it up to date was essential to reflect the current realities, as well as addressing the long-standing impediments to its implementation. This report presents the conclusions drawn by the SWG based on its collective knowledge and the findings of a survey it conducted. The survey, entitled “Implementing the Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration – where does the humanitarian community stand?” (cf. annex IV) was distributed to UN offices and NGOs globally.

**Work Plan**

Based on the above assumptions, the SWG developed the following strategy to accomplish its task:

1. Develop a survey aimed at collecting experiences with the use of the MoO, including instances in which the MoO had been specifically implemented as well as others in which the UN and NGOs had developed collaborative relationships without knowledge of the document.
2. Distribute the survey, accompanied by the MoO, as widely as possible throughout the humanitarian community to assess knowledge of the MoO’s existence.
3. Re-distribute the MoO accompanied by the final report in the hope that collective experiences from the field captured in the report would assist in demonstrating the possible benefits which could be achieved with its implementation.

**Development and Distribution of the Survey**

The survey was intended to be short and easy to navigate while remaining open enough to capture collaborative experiences inspired by the MoO or otherwise. The initial distribution of the survey and the MoO was accomplished through a number of channels and included:

1. UNDSS FSCOs in countries with a UN Consolidate Appeal
2. InterAction
   a. World Food Program Newsletter (WFP)
   b. NGO Networks
      a. The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction)
      b. International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
      c. Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)
      d. Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies Newsletter (VOICE)
   c. NGO Field Security Mechanisms
      a. Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO)
      b. NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq (NCCI)
      c. NGO Security Preparedness and Support Project (NGO-SPAS), Somalia
      d. Balochistan NGO Security Office (BINGO)
Survey Results
From the survey responses (cf. annex V), a number of re-occurring hurdles to UN/NGO security collaboration as well as a list of recommendations to overcome such hurdles and improve cooperation were identified.

Reoccurring Hurdles

1. **Personalities**
A clash of personalities between key actors in security matters can severely hinder cooperation. Good formal and informal communication among UN security personnel, IGOs and NGOs is essential for collaboration to work well – in large part, personal relationships and individual efforts to understand each others’ mandates and constraints go a long way in establishing trust and understanding that are at the heart of sharing sensitive information.

2. **Resources**
A general lack of human and financial resources for security often hampers UN agencies and NGOs from contributing to or fully participating in collaborative efforts. While the UN often has substantially more resources to devote to security, they often fall short of what is needed to provide the level of service that is expected from the rest of the humanitarian community.

3. **Diversity of Security Approaches**
Sometimes approaches to security are substantially different between NGOs and the UN (and among NGOs themselves). These differences can make collaboration on common security services difficult.

4. **Confidentiality**
Concerns about indiscrete use of sensitive information shared in collaborative mechanisms can often be a substantial barrier to sharing information – there are several examples where information shared in collaborative forums has turned up in the press.

5. **Priorities and Time Constraints**
Security is often only one of many priorities organizations have as they administer their programmes on the ground. However, it has been shown time and time again that poor security practices on the part of one organization can impact on the security of the entire community.

What emerged from the survey results was an almost complete endorsement of the original MoO of 2001. Since this indicates that today’s requirements and needs in security collaboration are to a large extent consistent with those identified in 2001, the SWG recommends that the MoO be re-launched. To this end it has updated, revised and renamed the document to better reflect its purpose and intent, and strongly recommends that it be adopted by the IASC for active and robust implementation on a country by country basis. The following overarching recommendations are essential for a successful implementation of the document:
Recommendations

1. Approval

That the IASC adopt the Framework for improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field, entitled “Saving Lives Together” (cf. annex 1).

2. Dissemination

a) That the IASC chair writes to principals of all IASC members with a recommendation that the Framework be distributed widely throughout their respective organizations to include the heads of country offices.

b) That the IASC chair request the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) to seek endorsement of the Framework through the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and that it be distributed to all Humanitarian Coordinators and Designated Officials throughout the UN system.

3. Raising Awareness

That every effort be made within the IGO, NGO and UN communities to raise the level of awareness of the Framework within their organizations, and strongly advocate for its use as an enabling mechanism for enhancing collaborative security management.

4. Implementation

a) That IASC members urge their constituents and/or field staff to convene a meeting dedicated to discussing the MoO and perhaps compare existing collaboration with the Framework as a way of identifying opportunities to enhance collaboration.

b) That all IGO, NGO and UN organizations which do not employ professional security personnel appoint a suitably experienced Security Focal Point to act as their representative in security collaboration forums. This measure would facilitate the development of a coherent and cohesive network with a shared understanding of the need to respect each other’s positions and, where stated, the maintenance of confidentiality.

Conclusion

There are few organizations within the humanitarian community that do not agree that the humanitarian working environment is becoming increasingly dangerous. While it must be accepted that there will always be a certain level of risk, much can be done to mitigate the degree of danger faced by field personnel. The MoO was originally designed to do just that and is as relevant today as it was when it was first conceived, representing the collective recognition that only in a joint effort can the humanitarian community minimize its risk in insecure environments. With this in mind, and with reference to the Survey Findings and Recommendations as highlighted above, an updated and revamped MoO entitled “Saving Lives Together” is attached at Annex 1, and should be implemented in the Field at the earliest possible time.
Annex I: Saving Lives Together

“A Framework for improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field”

1. Collaboration in the UN Security Management Team with Participation of NGOs/ and IGOs

a) That IGOs, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement may participate in relevant meetings of the UN Security Management Team (SMT) on an ex-officio1, representative basis.

b) That UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration be taken as a regular agenda item at UN Security Management Team meetings. As permitted within the framework of the UN Security Management System, consideration should be given to inviting Senior Managers of the NGO and IGO Communities to attend relevant portions of Security Management Team meetings.

c) That Protocols for sharing and dissemination of information discussed in Security Management Team meetings shall be agreed to in advance by all parties in attendance.

d) That where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors.

e) That IGO/NGO partners to UN organizations in specific humanitarian operations select among themselves one or a limited number of field security focal points.

2. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration and information sharing

a) That fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area, country and sub-office level be convened, at regular intervals, in order to address practical security issues of common concern.

b) That the fora may include the following regular participants:
   - DO / FSO / Area Security Coordinator or other DO Designee;
   - Members of the SMT as appropriate;
   - NGO field security focal point(s);
   - Representatives of IGOs;
   - Representatives of the Red Cross Movement.
   - The chairperson may be chosen on a rotating basis.

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1 Ex officio here refers to the fact that representatives of non-UN organizations are not bound by, nor participate formally in, SMT decisions on UN security policy.
c) That the fora may include topics of discussion, such as:
   • The exchange of security related information;
   • Incident reports;
   • Security and trend analysis;
   • Joint operational planning, as appropriate;
   • Protocols for the sharing and further dissemination of information and documents presented or discussed.

3. Including Staff Security Concerns in the Consolidated Appeals
That structured efforts to include well conceived and developed UN / NGO / IGO security projects within CAPs to cover the additional resources potentially required for enhanced collaboration on staff security by UN Agencies and NGOs / IGOs, such as telecommunications and security training.

4. Meeting Common Security-Related Needs and Sharing Resources
That whilst recognizing that individual NGOs’ financial resources are often more modest than those of the UN or IGOs, their contributions are nonetheless needed and that consideration should be given to what resources could be made available to help address common security related needs.

That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners, committed to security collaboration in each specific humanitarian operation, participate, to the extent feasible and based on the extent of their involvement, in meeting the uncovered, security-related needs of the humanitarian community.

5. Sharing Resources
That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian field operations, develop a local inventory for the sharing of their specialized, security-related human and material resources.

That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at field level be facilitated by:

a) The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication equipment within the framework of existing international agreements;

b) The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common, inter-agency frequency to facilitate greater interoperability for security collaboration for UN organizations and IGO/NGO operating in the same area without denying the need for agencies to have their own internal and integral communications infrastructure.

c) Humanitarian actors committing to security collaboration using standard communication procedures and, to the extent possible, providing staff with compatible communication systems.
7. Collaborating and Consulting in Security Training

That all UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at HQ and at field level:

a) Carry out joint security training in collaboration and/or consultation with other agencies to the extent possible.

b) When feasible, pool necessary resources to conduct field security training;

c) Seek to increase their capacity for security training at all levels;

d) Give consideration to the development of training packages that focus specifically on improving security collaboration.

8. Sharing Information

That security-related information be shared among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as the confidentiality required when dealing with sensitive information.

9. Identifying Minimum Security Standards

That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners jointly identify and agree on how to apply minimum security standards, principles, and/or guidelines adapted to local circumstances. In so doing, humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, principles, and/or guidelines for example the UN MOSS (Minimum Operational Security Standards) that are binding for the members of the UN system and InterAction’s Security Planning Guidelines.

10. Seeking Adherence to Common Humanitarian Ground-Rules

That the security collaboration of the UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific field operations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locally developed ground-rules for humanitarian action.
Annex II:

The Menu of Options

or

UN/NGO/IGO Guidelines for Security Collaboration

INTRODUCTION

As the organizations of the United Nations are increasingly working closely with Inter- and Non-Governmental Organization in hostile environments, there is a need to provide a framework for security collaboration. The Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration provide Designated Officials, Security Management Teams and Security Focal Points with practical options for enabling and maintaining security collaboration with NGO/IGOs.

UNSECOORD Guideline on UN/NGO Security Collaboration

The Designated Official shall undertake every effort to create and maintain an environment conducive to inter-Agency Security collaboration. The following guidelines provide a number of practical means of achieving this objective, some or all of which may be applicable to the particular circumstances of the duty station or area of operation. The Designated Official, in consultation with the Security Management Team, must determine the most appropriate options. As the guidelines are the result of extensive consultation including NGOs, some of the guidelines describe actions to be undertaken voluntarily by non-UN bodies.

A. Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team

1. That IGOs, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement may participate in the UN Security Management Team (SMT) on an ex officio, representative basis:

2. That where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors.

3. That IGO/NGO partners to UN organizations in specific humanitarian operations select among themselves one or a limited number of field security focal points

B. Convening broad-based fora for field security collaboration

That fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area, country and sub-office level be convened, at regular intervals, in order to address practical security issues of common concern. The fora may include the following regular participants: DO / FSO / Area Security Coordinator or other DO Designee; members of the SMT as appropriate; NGO field security focal point(s); representatives of IGOs; representatives of the Red Cross Movement. The chairperson may be chosen on a rotating basis.

C. Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals

That the CAPs include a project to cover the additional resources potentially required by enhanced collaboration on staff security by UN Agencies and NGO/IGOs, such as telecommunications and security training.
D. Meeting common, security-related needs
That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners, committed to security collaboration in each specific humanitarian operation participate, to the extent feasible, in meeting the uncovered, security-related needs of the humanitarian community, including costs, according to the scope of their respective involvement.

E. Sharing resources
That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian field operations develop a local inventory for the sharing of their specialized, security-related human and material resources.

F. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication
That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at field level are facilitated by:
1. The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication equipment within the framework of existing international agreements;
2. The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common frequency for security collaboration for UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners operating in the same area;
3. Humanitarian actors committed to security collaboration using standard communication procedures and, to the extent possible, providing staff with compatible communication systems.

G. Collaborating and consulting in security training
That all UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at HQ and at field level:
1. Carry out security training in collaboration and/or consultation with other agencies to the extent possible;
2. Seek to increase their capacity for security training at all levels.

H. Sharing information
That security-related information is shared among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as the confidentiality required when dealing with sensitive information.

I. Identifying minimum security standards
That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners jointly identify and agree how to apply minimum security standards adapted to local circumstances. In so doing, humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, for example the UN MOSS (minimum operational security standards) that are binding for the members of the UN system.

J. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules
That the security collaboration of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific field operations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locally developed ground-rules for humanitarian action.
### Annex III:

**IASC Approved Menu of Options**

### RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IASC-WG

From the IASC-WG Staff Security Task Force

**Final, 18 January 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General recommendations</th>
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| 1 | Strengthening security collaboration in Humanitarian operations  
That all UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners² adopt a policy of strengthening collaboration on staff security, both at HQ and at the field level, in the context of reinforcing their commitment to staff security. |
| 2 | Advocating for security  
That all humanitarian agencies and organizations represented in the Task Force engage in advocacy for greater awareness of the need for increased resources in support of field staff security, including resources for UN/non-UN security collaboration. |
| 3 | Appointing agency security focal points  
That humanitarian agencies and organizations represented in the Task Force that do not have an agency staff security focal point at the HQ, appoint one, and include inter-agency collaboration on staff security in his/her terms of reference. |
| 4 | Strengthening security management, including collaboration  
That all humanitarian agencies and organizations represented in the Task Force ensure that security management, including these recommendations are incorporated:  
(1) As part of the job description and the performance evaluation of their directors and managers, especially at the field level;  
(2) As an indicator of effectiveness and efficiency in the evaluation of humanitarian operations. |

² This includes those organizations at each duty station that are working in close collaboration with UN agencies, programmes and funds.
### Field-related recommendations

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<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Enhancing the role of the DO in security collaboration</strong></td>
<td>That the functions of the DO reflect the need for a profile which includes: (1) Skills in creating an environment conducive to inter-agency collaboration, including staff security; (2) Security training; (3) Field experience in security management.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team</strong></td>
<td>(1) That IGOs, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement may participate in the UN Security Management Team (SMT) on an ex officio³, representative basis (cf. recommendation 7); (2) That, where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Selecting NGO field security focal point(s)</strong></td>
<td>That IGO/NGO partners to UN organizations in specific humanitarian operations select among themselves one or a limited number of field security focal points (cf. recommendation 6).</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration</strong></td>
<td>That fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area, country and sub-office level be convened, at regular intervals, in order to address practical security issues of common concern, for example by: (1) Identifying, from a menu of options on security collaboration, those fitting into the specific field situation (see appendix); (2) Implementing and updating such practical collaboration in its various forms on a regular basis. The fora may include the following regular participants: DO / FSO / Area Security Coordinator or other DO Designee; members of the SMT as appropriate; NGO field security focal point(s); representatives of IGOs; representatives of the Red Cross Movement. The chairperson may be chosen on a rotating basis.</td>
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³ Ex officio here refers to the fact that representatives of non-UN organizations are not bound by, nor participate formally in, SMT decisions on UN security policy.
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<tr>
<th>9</th>
<th>Including staff security concerns in the CAPs</th>
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<tr>
<td>That the CAPs include a project to cover the additional resources potentially required by enhanced collaboration on staff security by agencies and organizations represented in the Task Force such as telecommunication (cf. rec. 12) and security training (cf. rec. 13).</td>
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<th>10</th>
<th>Meeting common, security-related needs</th>
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<td>That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners, committed to security collaboration in each specific humanitarian operation participate, to the extent feasible, in meeting the uncovered, security-related needs of the humanitarian community⁴, including costs, according to the scope of their respective involvement.</td>
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<th>11</th>
<th>Sharing resources</th>
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<td>That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian field operations develop a local inventory for the sharing of their specialized, security-related human and material resources.</td>
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<th>12</th>
<th>Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication</th>
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<tr>
<td>That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at field level be facilitated by:</td>
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<td>(1) The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication equipment within the framework of existing international agreements;</td>
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<td>(2) The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common frequency for security collaboration for UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners operating in the same area;</td>
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<td>(3) Humanitarian actors committed to security collaboration using standard communication procedures and, to the extent possible, providing staff with compatible communication systems.</td>
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<th>13</th>
<th>Collaborating and consulting in security training</th>
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<td>That all UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at HQ and at field level:</td>
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<td>Carry out security training in collaboration and/or consultation with other agencies to the extent possible;</td>
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<td>Seek to increase their own capacity for security training at all levels.</td>
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<th>14</th>
<th>Sharing information</th>
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<td>That security-related information be shared among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as the confidentiality required when dealing with sensitive information.</td>
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⁴ Humanitarian community in this report refers to the totality of humanitarian actors in a given place, addressing the same humanitarian crisis.
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<th></th>
<th><strong>Identifying minimum security standards</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners jointly identify and agree how to apply minimum security standards adapted to local circumstances. In so doing, humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, for example the UN MOSS (minimum operational security standards) that are binding for the members of the UN system.</td>
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<th><strong>Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules</strong></th>
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<td>That the security collaboration of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific field operations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locally developed ground-rules for humanitarian action.</td>
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**Recommendations on follow-up**

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<th><strong>Disseminating and evaluating</strong></th>
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<td>That the members of the UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners:</td>
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<td>Disseminate the recommendations on security collaboration within their respective agencies and organizations, especially at the field level;</td>
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<td>Ensure that the utility of the recommendations is evaluated within their respective agencies and organizations.</td>
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<th><strong>Learning lessons</strong></th>
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<td>That the UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners:</td>
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<td>(1) Disseminate the recommendations on staff security collaboration;</td>
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<td>(2) Review the implementation of the present recommendations;</td>
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<td>(3) Prepare and disseminate regular Lessons Learnt reports on security collaboration, based on reports from their agencies and organizations.</td>
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Annex IV:

The Survey

Implementing the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration

Where does the humanitarian community stand?

This survey is being distributed to members of the humanitarian community in an attempt to get a better understanding of the extent to which the Guidelines are being used, what approaches to its implementations have worked, and which have not. While we appreciate ANY time you may have to complete this survey, your thoughtful and reflective answers are greatly appreciated prior to close of business Friday, December 17th, 2004. We would like to thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your completed surveys should be returned via email to sbardwell@interaction.org and Alan Vernon vernon@unhcr.ch.

A complete copy of the Guidelines has been attached for your reference.

1. Are you aware of the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration? If your response to this question is NO, we encourage you to respond to question number two below for any collaborative actions taken within the humanitarian community to address security.

2. Below are the ten guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO collaboration. Please take a moment to comment on the extent to which options (detailed on the attached Guidelines) for each of the Guidelines below has been considered and/or implemented at your current or past field posting. Your comments on what has worked and what has not worked when implementing the Guidelines are very important to us and will be shared with the entire community, without individual attribution, once compiled.

a. Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team:

b. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration: Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals:

c. Meeting common, security-related needs: Sharing resources:

d. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunications:

e. Collaborating and consulting in security training:

f. Sharing information:

g. Identifying minimum security standards:

h. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules:

Best practice in Security Management: As part of its effort to promote effective security collaboration, the IASC Working Group is particularly interested in fostering efforts which promote a common understanding of the situation and the factors that affect security as well as common efforts to promote acceptance of humanitarian action and the security of humanitarian actors.
3. Has the humanitarian community undertaken collective efforts to develop a common understanding of the situation in terms of the political and security context, humanitarian needs, local communities/ power structures and national/ local perceptions of humanitarian actors and their work? If so, what particular approaches and methods have been utilized to do so?

We welcome any additional comments you may have regarding the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration.
Annex V:

Summary of Survey Findings and Conclusions

Awareness of the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration

Findings:
- 100% of UNDSS personnel surveyed but only 44% of NGO and UN humanitarian agency respondents were aware of the MoO.

Conclusions:
- Wide-spread confusion regarding security-related Memorandums of Understanding signed between the UN and NGOs and the MoO.

Enhancing Collaboration in the UN Security Management Team

Findings:
- Normally, UNDSS conveys the deliberations of the Security Management Teams (SMTs) to NGOs in the context of other regular coordination and security information. It also acts as a primary conduit of security information from NGOs to the UN SMTs.
- Due to confusion regarding the difference between security coordination meetings and SMT meetings, the latter are widely perceived as internal UN meetings. One security initiative manager commented that “according to my experience, [participation on the SMT] depends a lot on the UN personalities and is not really standard across countries.”

Conclusions:
- If critical security information and analysis that may allow NGOs to better navigate an insecure environment is not shared with NGOs, the UN’s own humanitarian response will be crippled.
- Responsible NGO participation, as observers, on UN SMTs will facilitate the sharing of vital information that would not otherwise be shared in more “public” general or security coordination meetings.
- There exists a need for a cultural change within the UN humanitarian system that recognizes NGOs as an indispensable part of its own response, albeit independent of the UN system.

Convening Broad-based Forums for Field Security Collaboration & Information Sharing

Findings:
- Information sharing is the most prevalent form of security collaboration. Regularly scheduled meetings including a security component are standard practice in the proceedings between UN personnel and NGOs in insecure environments.
- The frequency and prominence of security as a topic in these meetings (generally held at the field level rather than in the capitals) is largely a function of the level of insecurity of the working environment.
- These meeting become more frequent and substantive when NGO security initiatives or NGO security focal points exist.
Conclusions:

• While the security of aid workers is a central concern, meetings covering this issue tend to be geared toward a recitation of incident specifics rather than involving critical discussion or analysis of the circumstances surrounding the incidents.
• Much progress could be made to better the timeliness, accuracy, and format of the information that is shared. However, respondents confirmed that information is only part of the equation that results in sound security decisions.

Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals

Findings:

• UNDSS and UN humanitarian agencies respondents are generally sceptical about the viability of adequately addressing security concerns within the CAP process, despite the fact that almost half of the UN responses indicated that the CAP had generated contributions for security requirements in their AOR. This was apparently attributable to the lengthy delay in turning CAP security contributions into "boots on the ground". With two exceptions, NGO respondents perceived the CAP as a solely a UN initiative. Overall it was evident that security is not often well integrated into the CAP strategy.

Conclusion:

• In is in the best interest of the humanitarian community to ensure well-conceived security analysis and achievable project proposals in the CAPS. Moreover it is essential that the Designated Official ensure that security requirements and initiatives are an integral component of humanitarian strategy and to reinforce this through all aspects of the CAP Process. The CAP is perhaps the best means of meeting common security requirements of the humanitarian community and to this end, the UN and NGOs must ramp up efforts to include well conceived security projects as a core component of all Consolidated Appeals

Meeting Common Security-Related Needs & Sharing Resources

Findings:

• Responses to this aspect of collaboration tended to focus on UN derived services and resources (e.g. communication equipment, networks infrastructure, and network management) that could be provided to the humanitarian community.

Conclusions:

• There is perhaps an unbalanced expectation on the part of NGOs that the responsibility for meeting common security-related needs lies largely with the UN through sharing or providing security related resources and services.
• While the resource pool within the UN is, in most cases, substantially greater than that of the NGO community, NGOs have much to contribute.

Facilitating Inter-Agency Telecommunications

Findings:

• Inter-Agency telecommunication services have come to be a standard service provided by the UN; the NGO community perceives these services to be a UN responsibility rather than a collaborative effort between the two.

Conclusions:
While the UN is perhaps best placed to provide this service, the difficulties it faces are seldom recognized by the humanitarian community as a whole. The UN is often confronted with numerous challenges such as restrictions imposed by host governments, insufficient resources to provide adequate coverage for a large, widely dispersed community, and compatibility issues.

**Collaborating and Consulting in Security Training**

**Findings:**
- Sharing security-training resources between the UN and NGOs is not part of the “standard operating procedures” of either. Sharing is often far from being collaborative or cooperative.

**Conclusions:**
- Greater efforts are required on part of both the UN and NGOs to be more open about accessing and truly sharing training resources.
- Simple considerations, such as larger venues or more inclusive and diverse curricula, open up the possibility of increasing the number of individuals that are trained, as well as promoting a better understanding of the various approaches to security and how they impact on one another.

**Identifying Minimum Security Standards**

**UNDSS Response:** UN MOSS is often seen as the most appropriate standard, however few NGOs observe full MOSS in all situations. UN and NGO standards are much closer in high risk scenarios than in less threatening environments.

**InterAction Response:** UN respondents appear to be of the mind that a common set of MOSS is undesirable as it would lower the UN standards. Some NGO respondents felt a common MOSS would hamper their work and cited several hurdles such as differences in resource availability and the politics/economics surrounding UN security phases.

**Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules**

**UNDSS Response:** This question was not well understood by the FSCOs, however some saw this as the responsibility of OCHA.

**InterAction Response:** It seems that for the most part, people feel that there is enough of a difference between the UN and NGOs to hinder, if not prevent, the development of common ground-rules.

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1. The UNDSS Guidelines for UN/NGO security collaboration of 14 February 2002 are almost identical to the IASC guidance and have been re-distributed on an annual basis since 2002.
2. See annex I for version approved by IASC and annex II for version approved by UNSECOORD
3. See annex III
4. Observer status entails participation in security discussions and in no way implies involvement in UN security decisions on internal policies and procedures with regard to their personnel.